Spalpeen

For no particular reason, here I repost my essay on the differences between Classical and Structural Realism in International Relations.

Which provides the most convincing account of the current security environment, Classical or Structural Realism?

by Conrad Quilty-Harper

This essay comes at a time of crossroads between classical or “human nature” realist thought on one side, and systemic or structural realists on the other. The rise of structural methods of thought in the 1970s saw a decline in the popularity of classical realist thought, although it has seen a recent resurgence in popularity at the start of the 21st Century. Does the end of the Cold War justify a return to classical realist thought? Did structural realists misunderstand and unfairly dismiss Morgenthau’s work? Or does Mearsheimer’s policy advice stemming from his offensive realism extend structural realism’s relevance to the extent that we do not need classical understandings of realism? This essay will argue that structural realists incorrectly interpreted Morgenthau’s stated importance of human nature, and that a reaffirmation of the importance of classical realist thought is justified. This essay will also show how Mearsheimer’s advice to contain China’s rise is dangerous and unnecessary, and the inevitably fatalist consequences of structural realism are neither desirable nor necessary.

At this point it is worth noting that because realism cannot offer a comprehensive account of the entirety of the security environment – realism deals with states, and not individuals, so it can never adequately answer the threat of ‘undeterrable ideologues’ , such as those found in Al Qaeda – this essay will not take them into account. Instead, it will deal mainly with the problems of China and Russia: the two most problematic case studies central to the field of realism.

Although it is simplistic to say that classical realism “came first” in the discipline of international relations – Dickinson invented the concept of “anarchy” in the political system in 1916  – it is true that a classical conception of realism was the first to dominate political thought, and that the structural view came in response to it. Therefore, we shall establish the foundations and attributes of classical realism, determine how structural realism diverges from classical realism, and then apply both schools of thought to the current security environment.

Classical realists argue that a realist thread reaches back over 2,500 years of writing. Thucydides wrote in The History of the Peloponnesian War that the events of the war it described had been repeated in the past, and were doomed to be repeated again and again, that ‘the cycle of hubris, ate¯, hamartia and nemesis [pride, folly, flaws and retribution] would repeat itself as long as humans stride the earth.’  Machiavelli, Hobbes, Clausewitz and Bismarck also contributed to a thread of realism throughout history. Machiavelli considered international rule to be nothing but war, with the “passion of men” being the motivation for all actions, Hobbes spoke in Leviathan of the natural state of humanity being a ‘war of every man against every man’ , and Bismarck’s famous speech in 1862 praised the tangible strength of ‘Blood and Iron’  over weak speeches and resolutions for effecting change. The publication of Edward Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis was the first time these thinkers were combined into a practical theory of realism, designed to oppose the ineffectiveness of idealism.

The failure of the idealists and their institutions to prevent a repeat of the First World War provided a substantial background and justification to Carr’s claim to the centrality of power to the international system, and his call to discard talk of morality and ethics in international relations, which he considered to be ‘window-dressing, a way ideology tries to cloak its real intentions’.  In Carr’s world of realism, military strength negated idealism: if the concept of utopia was to exist, such a utopia would be built by the winners. To Carr, universal principles could not have any relevance to political science: what mattered in reality was “who you were” as a state, and “who you were” as a state was pre-determined as an entity with an insatiable and innate drive to gain more power. In response to the idealists, Carr stated that ‘”international order” and “international solidarity” will always be slogans of those who feel strong enough to impose them on others’. 

Hans Morgenthau clarified Carr’s theory with his six principles in Politics Among Nations, where he argued that; 1) state behaviour is intrinsically linked to a determinist view of human nature, defined by the classical philosophies of “China, India, and Greece”  and the examples explored earlier; 2) states pursue their interests, which are defined as power, 3) states are motivated by increasing their power; 4) the international system is amoral; 5) morality only exists within states; and  6), the arena of political concern is devoid of morality and other modes of thought. Through his six principles, Morgenthau correctly predicted that international institutions like the United Nations would be too weak to deter great powers from acting in their own interests for the pursuit of power. To Morgenthau, the balance of power is the most important factor in explaining the way states act. 

The first substantial structural realist argument against classical realism came with Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the State and War, in which he argued that classical realism is too “reductive”: it tries to predict the behaviour of states, rather than the outcomes of that behaviour. The structural realist view is one that takes Morgenthau’s acknowledgement that states exist within an anarchical international system and uses it, in Waltz’s words, to form the ‘idea of the third image’ , an argument that the circumstances that states find themselves in ensures the way that they will act. There is no higher body capable of influencing the actions of states, since the only currency worth anything in a realist view is power, and states have all the power. If one state increases its power by x percent, and another state increases (or decreases) its power by the same x percent, neither is more secure. To Waltz, Morgenthau’s hypothesis does not include this concept of a “third image”, and limits itself only to the study of the state and the individual. 

Waltz’s reading of Morgenthau’s realism – Williams considers Waltz’s view of Morgenthau’s human nature theory to be ‘reductionist, pessimistic, [and] indefensibly deterministic’  – includes the assertion that Morgenthau is stating an ethical norm when he uses human nature as an explanation for state behaviour. By saying that human nature is to want more power, Waltz argues that Morgenthau is also implying that human nature ought to constitute wanting power. Morgenthau’s statement that ‘foreign policy derived from the national interest is in fact morally superior to a foreign policy inspired by universal moral principles’  would constitute a “normative statement that one may accept or reject according to [Morgenthau’s] inclination”,  and a very extreme interpretation of moral principles, to the extent that Kaufman considers Morgenthau to be ‘pathologically hostile to all forms of universal moral claims without making reasonable distinctions among them.’  Amongst the recent resurgence and reappraisal of Morgenthau’s theories this could be considered harsh: Williams in Realism Reconsidered argues that Morgenthau’s acknowledgement of human nature and the importance of morality (he believed that all humans viewed the world through a moral lens, which they could not remove) could constitute the idea of a “moral sensibility”, which helps explain the current security environment. The emergence and employment of Bush’s neoconservative doctrine that utilises pre-emptive strikes – motivated by a lack of satisfaction with the amorality of structural realism – is of course a mutilation of Morgenthau’s classical realism, but they nonetheless are ‘linked in view of the importance of morality for understanding both’ . Williams argues in the introduction to Realism Reconsidered that classical realism is in fact a “politics of scepticism”, to neoconservatism’s “politics of faith”. Following from this, he considers structural realism to be insufficiently moral, and neoconservatism to be incorrectly moral. Morgenthau’s argument that universal moral principles should be discarded in favour of a universal “power principle” offers a better option that steps the line between both concepts.

We should acknowledge that a key concept of Morgenthau’s theory was the idea of responsible statesmen. In his view, statesmen not only had a responsibility to look after individuals within their states, but they also had a responsibility to intervene when other states refused or fail to do the same for their own individual citizens. To Morgenthau, it could not be enough for an individual to possess knowledge of the system in order to determine his actions (opposing structural realism’s scientific basis, which relies singly on the balance of power within the international structure to determine the correct action). Williams goes further in pointing out that Morgenthau’s theory calls for a sense of virtue in statesmen: a statesman needs knowledge, but he also needs courage and skill in diplomacy. Morgenthau’s ideal international system would be one formed of statesmen with knowledge of the effects of power and interest, not just in the view of their own state, but in the eyes of other states.

Key to Waltz’s theory is John Herz’s security dilemma, the concept of an anarchical competition for security between states (which paradoxically guarantees that no state can ever achieve security). Herz’s security dilemma starts with the assumption that states cannot ever know other states’ true intentions. Since there is no higher body in the international system capable of guaranteeing individual states’ security, states will inevitably acquire an army to guarantee their own security, since they cannot accept assurances from other states that they will not attempt to attack them now (and even if they do accept this, there is the matter of future uncertainty, where a future change in state leadership results in a more aggressive foreign policy). This requires other states to build up their own militaries in response, and the cycle repeats. Herz is one of the key elements in the deductive split that John Mearsheimer made with Waltz’s view in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

To Mearsheimer, the tragedy referred to in the title of his book is that even if a state possesses no intention to harm or dominate other states, it will be forced to increase its relative power and the capability of its military in relation to other states in order to increase its security, that the international system ‘forces all states, whether they have revisionist goals or not, to behave as if they were revisionist powers and compete with each other for power.’  Waltz would agree with his five assumptions made in Great Power Politics, that; 1) the international system is anarchic; 2) all states have offensive military capabilities; 3) no state can be certain of the intentions of other states, nor the likelihood that their military capability will be used against them; 4) all states seek to survive; and 5) all states act rationally in search of survival. Where Mearsheimer differs with Waltz is in his deduction of these points. Whereas Waltz makes it clear that states are at risk if they have too little or too much power, in that ‘sensible statesmen [should] try to have an appropriate amount of it’  and that ‘[t]he first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system’ , Mearsheimer believes that as a consequence of his five assumptions, all states will seek to maximise their relative power, and that the only limits on the search for relative power are cost vs. benefit considerations and the “stopping power of water”. In this theory of “offensive realism”, states can only guarantee their security if they become a hegemonic power and therefore all states will attempt to become hegemonic powers in their region of the world. Waltz’s belief that states only seek enough power to survive is not satisfactory for Mearsheimer: if the system is anarchic, then surely only enough power for a state is all the power they can get.

A closer reading of Herz reveals that the justifications for Mearsheimer’s arguments do not quite fit with his original theory of the security dilemma. Stirk argues that the basis for much of Mearsheimer’s hypothesising about Herz is a mistake,  and that there is actually no security dilemma under Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. If all states are revisionist, then there cannot be a dilemma, since all states will inherently know each other’s intention (ironically, Mearsheimer would say something equivalent about Waltz’s theory: if all states seek to maintain the status quo, then how are states threatened?). 

Territoriality is central to the structure of the security dilemma, with each state possessing a “hard-shell” that forms an individual state’s place in the order. This has negative consequences for Mearsheimer’s theorising: to Mearsheimer, nuclear weapons form the “ultimate defence”, and through deterrence techniques, they act as a way of securing a state’s place in the security dilemma (hence Iran and North Korea’s rapid attempts to gain nuclear weapons after the Iraq war, which was loosely predicated on preventing Saddam Hussein from obtaining them). Herz takes the opposite view to Mearsheimer, in that nuclear weapons not only break but bypass the “hard-shell” that forms each state’s territorial basis in the international structure. The introduction of nuclear weapons makes the concepts of war and peace irrelevant, allowing only a disruptive perpetual insecurity between states. 

As a” realist liberal”, Herz meant the security dilemma as an essential tool in “survival research” (and one that should be ultimately transcended) not as something that must be realised and taken to its conclusion. Mearsheimer is in danger of taking such a path with his policy advice for the United States at the conclusion of Great Power Politics. In his theory, China will attempt to achieve regional hegemony in Asia, which mandates a policy of containment. By continuing its current policy of helping China grow to become a member of the global status quo, Mearsheimer argues that the United States is in fact creating a monster that will attempt to achieve regional hegemony, eventually resulting in a war. However, neither the liberal view which Mearsheimer opposes (the West should engage with China) nor Mearsheimer’s structural realist view (China’s rise should be contained) offer an adequate explanation for how to deal with the question of China. If China’s rise is truly a matter of zero-sum power transition, as Mearsheimer would argue, then it requires both Washington and Beijing to accept the premise that ‘time favours its adversary’ . Chan argues that an effective diplomatic policy offers a better option in the case of China, at which point we must stop and recall Morgenthau’s emphasis on the importance of skills in the art of diplomacy.

Christensen’s advice on the problem of how to deal with China is that any U.S. response must not exclusively consist of either; a) strengthening the U.S. military presence in the region (structural realist view) or; b) engaging in discussion with China (idealist/liberal view), but in the ‘art of coercive diplomacy.’  The best response in Christensen’s view would be one that is tough, but not overly provocative towards China : in the specific case of Taiwan, the U.S. needs to make a credible commitment to defend that nation, balanced by an assurance to China that this threat will not be used to further independence of Taiwan. This policy is far more likely to succeed at allaying tensions in the Taiwan Strait than Mearsheimer’s “contain China” policy advice mantra. Indeed, Warner argues that if you ‘take out the historical examples and jargon about hypotheses and counterfactuals, [Great Power Politics] reads as if he had come out of the Policy Planning Section of the US State Department’ . Mearsheimer himself admits that he wishes international relations theory was more closely aligned with its practice,  so one wonders, like Chan , whether Mearsheimer will take responsibility if the U.S. “buys in” to his theory of containment, and the consequence is war in the Taiwan Strait. The earlier stated elements of  Morgenthau’s effective diplomacy offers a far more convincing account of how the U.S. might succeed in helping China’s rise to great power status.

The case of the rise of Russia could be similarly dealt with by a coercive diplomatic approach. Consider that in the post-Cold War environment, Russia still possesses the second largest nuclear power in the world  (China and Russia’s nuclear weapons means that in Mearsheimer’s view, ‘both qualify as great powers’ ), yet it still seeks to increase its power with a $200 billion defence spending plan over seven years. Russia has lost its ideology, yet it still seeks a realist great power balancing policy in response to the U.S. When the U.S. places missiles in Poland, it states that it will target the sites with its own nuclear weapons, when the U.S. places a radar station in the Czech Republic, Russia states it will place nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad. This series of events is surely proof that the U.S.’s aggressive – some would say ignorant – attitude to Russian ambitions is dangerous, and that it needs to more tactfully engage with Russia in the future. If the Missile Defense system is truly about diminishing the threat of rogue states, then the U.S. should strongly consider the Russian offer for use of Azerbaijan,  although all signs point to the continuation of development of missile defense sites in Easter Europe.

This essay has shown that structural realists have incorrectly interpreted Morgenthau’s view of human nature and his theory’s element of informed diplomacy would stand up to the case of China and Russia’s rise far more effectively than Mearsheimer’s offensive structural realism. Indeed, a realisation of a structural view in this region would both be dangerous (in that it might potentially result in war in the Taiwan Strait) and unnecessary (since a correct reading of Herz’s security dilemma actually calls for its transcendence, not its realisation). Morgenthau has been misunderstood, and his views of virtuous statesmen equip states to deal more effectively with the problem of aspiring powers than a strictly scientific structural realism approach.